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In a recent article in this journal, Alex Preda (2004) analyzes the history 
of financial economics—also called modern financial theory—from a 
sociology of knowledge perspective and a sociology of science perspec-
tive. Preda’s article sheds new light on the emergence of financial eco-
nomic works in the nineteenth century. It explains how models, graphi-
cal tools, and theoretical arguments used by academic science had emerged 
from rationalization and conceptualization developed outside the science. 
In the process, Preda’s article introduced an intermediate step: “vernac-
ular economics,” which “is understood to comprise heterogeneous sets of 
practices, know-how techniques, and rationalization procedures that help 
social actors make sense of their economic environment and of the eco-
nomic consequences of their own actions. Rather than a body of homoge-
neous, abstract, and formalized explanations of economic processes, ver-
nacular economics is grounded in tacit, commonly shared assumptions 
and knowledge about economic processes” (Preda 2004, 354). In addition, 
it is “shabbier and not rigorous” and is “oriented toward solving everyday 
problems, [while] the academic variety is more concerned with elaborat-
ing a unified conceptual frame” (354). There is another important criterion 
to separate these two kinds of economics: the social group that publishes 
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the work or to whom these publications are addressed. We have “the 
academic [versus] the nonacademic science of financial markets” (356), 
that is, academic science versus vernacular science. As Preda’s article 
explains, recent research has been examining the relationship between 
academic economics and vernacular economics. While it is generally 
considered that these two kinds of science coexisted, Preda suggests that 
the latter existed before the former. More precisely, the aim of the article 
is to show how “popular” efforts transformed financial investing into an 
academic science (356). The article succeeds in showing how a rational-
ization and a conceptualization of financial attitudes had led to the devel-
opment of abstract concepts, abstract tools, and rational investment rules, 
which were used later by academic researchers to build a new academic 
science.
The analysis of this progressive evolution is made through the “cogni-
tive and cultural background” of authors who published during the same 
period, such as Jules Regnault and Henri Lefèvre—that is, authors who 
published between the 1860s and the end of the 1890s. The cultural 
background must be understood as the financial practices and knowl-
edge of that time. This focus on financial practices and knowledge aims 
to defend the hypothesis that academic financial economics comes from 
practical problems, which were analyzed first by vernacular financial 
economics. To support this hypothesis, Preda identifies an international 
“vernacular science of financial markets.” Within this science, vernacu-
lar financiers would have used the same tools, concepts, hypotheses, and 
methods that would have been “popular” during the nineteenth century 
in France, the United States, and the United Kingdom. In other words, 
the article points out that there was no geographical limit for such prac-
tices and knowledge at the time—at least not in Western countries. More-
over, because this international movement was not structured as an aca-
demic science and did not share the above criteria used to separate academic 
science from vernacular science, Preda considers it to be vernacular finan-
cial economics, which had promoted hypotheses used around thirty-five 
years later by academics such as Louis Bachelier. Obviously, Preda’s 
article concludes that “we cannot argue anymore that we have a string of 
isolated ‘moments of genius’—Jules Regnault in the early 1860s, then 
Henri Lefèvre in the early 1870s, and then Louis Bachelier. . . . it was 
not cultural exceptionalism but the French investor’s search for practi-
cal answers to practical problems, arising in the everyday preoccupa-
tion with financial investments, that accounts for those developments” 
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(380). However, there are two major difficulties with Preda’s argumenta-
tion. First, the relevance of the distinction between vernacular econom-
ics and academic economics for economic or financial theoretical work 
in nineteenth-century France remains unclear, and so does the justifica-
tion of classifying Regnault and Lefèvre’s work as vernacular science. 
Second, the construction of the general movement that dealt with the 
“vernacular science of financial markets” rests on several points of con-
fusion about algebra and probability as well as about options and futures 
or bonds.
1. The Difficult Distinction between  
“Vernacular” Economics and  
“Academic” Economics
1.1. “Vernacular” Economics and “Academic” 
Economics in Nineteenth-Century France
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, several communities of econ-
omists and several kinds of economic works existed in France. With the 
distinction between “academic” science and “vernacular” science, how 
do we classify the French econo-engineers or the French actuaries who 
developed microeconomics and mathematical economics (Zylberberg 
1990; Ekelund and Hébert 1999)? To be sure, just like most French econ-
omists, the large majority of econo-engineers and actuaries were not aca-
demic economists, and their interest was in solving practical problems—
such was the case with Jules Dupuit (Ekelund and Hébert 1999). As Robert 
Ekelund and Robert Hébert (1999, 39) explain, “Why were French engi-
neers more productive in the development of economic theory than the 
orthodox economists? Perhaps part of the answer lies in Albert Caquot’s 
boast that ‘engineers do economics while others talk about it.’”1 Never-
theless, there was a significant point of contrast between the econo-engi-
neers and French economists as a whole. The former used rigorous dem-
onstration and formalized and abstract explanations. By contrast, at the 
end of the nineteenth century, the majority of French economists in aca-
demia were opposed to the use of mathematics or abstract reasoning. 
Their works were descriptive, provided few demonstrations—literary or 
mathematical—and were less rigorous than those developed at the same 
time by econo-engineers. 
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1. Caquot’s boast is cited in Divisia 1951, x. 
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The institutionalization of economics in France also helps show that 
the distinction between vernacular economics and academic economics 
does not apply easily to nineteenth-century France. In France, economics 
was only institutionalized in 1877 (Le Van-Lemesle 1991, 2004). Before, 
the educational system was a casual affair: as Le Van-Lemesle (2004, 9) 
explains, during the nineteenth century in France, liberal practitioners cre-
ated and elaborated an informal system to spread economics.2 Thus, until 
the 1870s there were French economists who used and developed bodies 
of homogeneous theories, but there were no academic economics.3 These 
economists were practitioners who learned economics on their own from 
books, by attending private conferences and participating in sociétés 
savantes—like the Société d’économie politique—and by taking a few 
courses here and there (Le Van-Lemesle 2004, 163–64). In view of this, it 
is fair to say that during the nineteenth century and until 1877, the distinc-
tion between practitioners and theoreticians was not appropriate for the 
simple reason that all theoreticians were also practitioners (Le Van-Lemesle 
2004, 190).
1.2. Can the Works of Regnault or Lefèvre  
Be Considered as Vernacular Science?
Is it appropriate to regard the contributions of Jules Regnault and Henri 
Lefèvre as vernacular science? To include their works in a vernacular sci-
ence of investment, as Preda does, one must demonstrate that they meet 
the criteria outlined in the introduction. As we will see, this inclusion is 
dubious.
The first criterion, as the reader may recall, pertained to the kind of 
work. To include their work in “vernacular economics,” “to which Reg-
nault and Lefèvre contributed” (Preda 2004, 355), means that their 
works are “shabbier and not rigorous.” If we compare Regnault’s work 
with a current book on mathematical finance, obviously it can be easily 
considered not rigorous, but in comparison with books published in eco-
nomics or in finance at the time, in particular in France, it was rigorous. 
For instance, Bernard Bru explained that “there is a gigantic body of lit-
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2. Economics education was promoted by liberal economists and was mainly based on 
Jean-Baptiste Say’s theoretical works.
3. Some economics courses were being offered at French grandes écoles and universities, 
but the courses were not part of a larger curriculum and were not offered on an ongoing basis. 
For instance, the first course was given at the École normale in 1795, but after four months, it 
was discontinued (Le Van-Lemesle 2004, 47–54). 
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erature on the Exchange [in the nineteenth century in France]. But these 
are not interesting books (“How to Make a Fortune,” etc.). There’s Reg-
nault’s book which is unique, and which we know about” (Taqqu 2001, 
14). Unlike other publications, which aimed at educating investors, Reg-
nault’s book contains theoretical models and empirical tests,4 and it took 
its place nicely in the academic and scientific debates of the time about 
the social sciences—it used in particular conventional scientific criteria 
(i.e., criteria of academic science). More precisely, this book extended 
Adolphe Quételet’s research program to a new field: the determination 
of “scientific laws” that rule financial markets (Jovanovic 2001, 2006a).5 
We know that Quételet was the first to realize the Condorcet and Laplace 
program, which aimed at applying the theory of probability to the social 
world. From Quételet, Regnault borrowed the tools, the hypotheses, and 
the methods, as well as the style for presenting his results (Jovanovic 
2006a).6 Contrary to Regnault, financial manuals published during the 
same period did not use mathematical demonstration or empirical vali-
dation, and their statements were not discussed in academic debates or 
academic programs. For these reasons, Regnault’s book differs from 
other financial publications of the mid-1860s: it is difficult to consider it 
as “shabbier and not rigorous” and to consider that it does not use abstract 
or homogeneous explanations. These remarks also apply to Henri Lefèvre’s 
work (Jovanovic 2002, 2006b).
The second criterion dealt with the social group that publishes the work 
or to whom the publications are addressed. To include Regnault and 
Lefèvre’s works in “vernacular” economics also means that they were not 
addressed to or published by academics. Indeed, Preda (2004, 353) 
explains that “neither Jules Regnault nor Henri Lefèvre did actually write 
for an academic readership. . . . Their publications explicitly addressed 
investors, and their aim was to provide practical advice.” Preda adds that 
“by calling Regnault and Lefèvre ‘economists,’ against their own judg-
ment, we risk privileging ‘intellectual accidents,’ according to which 
financial economics was developed by isolated individuals who had few 
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4. This use of data constitutes one of the first pieces of econometrics and has no equivalent 
in other financial publications of the time. See Jovanovic and Le Gall 2002 and Le Gall 
2006.
5. Jules Regnault and his brother studied in Brussels when Quételet had a great influence 
and audience in the country, which led him to reform both education and research (Jovanovic 
2006a).
6. Transfers of tools, methods, and hypotheses used in a discipline already recognized as 
a science are common in attempts to create a new science.
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things in common (if any) with the vernacular financial knowledge of 
their time” (355). We have explained above the particular place of econ-
omists in France before 1877: when Regnault published his book, there 
was no academic community or courses in finance. Despite that, Regnault 
does not refer to publications addressed to investors but only to academic 
publications in the social sciences.7 Moreover, although his book was taken 
up in public debates (Jovanovic and Le Gall 2001), several elements show 
that it was not addressed to investors at first, but to scientists and scholars.8 
Henri Lefèvre, who started to publish in finance after Regnault, was a 
teacher and a French actuary.9 He created at the Institut polytechnique—
not to be confused with the École polytechnique—a course in “higher 
financial education” and published a number of textbooks or pedagog-
ical books that dealt with theoretical and academic considerations. As 
he explained, “It is in speculative trade that political economy will dis-
cover the theory of the circulation of wealth, which is one of the prin-
cipal objects of its investigations” (1879, 19). Moreover, in 1882, he 
published a brochure, of which Mr. Harang, president of the education 
section of the Seine Accountancy Committee, writing in the 1 August 
1882 issue of the Revue de la comptabilité, proclaimed that “the teach-
ing of accounting will soon be divided into two schools: one consisting of 
the partisans of practical education and the other, the partisans of theo-
retical education. Without any doubt, the theoretical school will have 
been founded by Mr. H. Lefèvre” (emphasis in original). This initial bro-
chure was supplemented by a later work published in 1885, La comp­
tabilité: Théorie, pratique, et enseignement. In that book, Lefèvre explains 
that “the existing books on stock markets and banks are of no help toward 
the understanding of the very mechanism of their operations, although 
such was their aim. . . . The Traité des opérations de Bourse, by Cour-
tois, sheds no light on their operations; . . . no precise idea that could 
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7. Regnault quotes from only one book from a financier; all other quotations come from 
mathematicians, philosophers, and economists.
8. At least two elements are worth noting in that direction. One, Regnault’s book has two 
publishers. One of them, Mallet-Bachelier, was the most important publisher for scientific books 
at that time in France. Mallet-Bachelier did not publish books in finance (while the second pub-
lisher, Castel, did), and generally published books for specialists, rarely for a large public. Two, 
the title of Regnault’s book refers to a scientific question and not to a practical problem: calcul 
des chances is an expression used by mathematicians interested in probability calculus.
9. He took a degree in natural sciences in 1848, but from the 1850s onward steered his 
career toward economics, working his way into in the selective circle of economic journalists. 
His first publications were addressed to investors, but beginning in the 1860s his publications 
were mainly academic (Jovanovic 2006b).
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help toward teaching or a scientific approach can be found here” (Lefèvre 
1885, iii).
Regnault and Lefèvre are the two major examples used in Preda’s arti-
cle. But they are not unique: Preda also interprets Brasilier in the same 
perspective. However, is it legitimate to include Brasilier’s work in a ver-
nacular science of financial investment? Brasilier was a graduate of the 
École polytechnique and a teacher in the two most prestigious grandes 
écoles in France at the time: l’École des hautes études commerciales 
(HEC) and l’École supérieure de commerce de Paris (ESCP). His book, a 
textbook for students in applied mathematics, is rigorous and not shabby. 
Moreover, Brasilier (1891–93) presented and considered his work as one 
of actuarial science, a science that still existed at that time.10
2. Was There an International “Vernacular 
Science of Financial Markets”?
To demonstrate the existence of an international “vernacular science of 
financial markets,” Preda suggests that a number of authors applied to 
finance the same tools, data, and hypotheses as those used by Regnault 
and Lefèvre. Thus, according to Preda, during the nineteenth century, 
many authors would have used the probability calculus to analyze stock 
prices, would have compiled stock price data, would have used seasonal 
stock price variations in their analysis, and would have analyzed options 
and would have tried to price them, etc. However, these authors do not 
form a homogenous group, and Preda does not provide any systemic dem-
onstration that all authors were concerned by the same problems. For 
instance, the argument is made that, when Regnault published his book, 
price recording was not “standardized” (Preda 2004, 366, 370). This stan-
dardization would come from the influence of new technology: the intro-
duction of the ticker in 1867 in New York and in 1872 in London (367). 
The influence of this new technology on price recording would explain 
some differences between the two French authors, Regnault and Lefèvre, 
on the way “prices were perceived” (368): “There is a striking difference 
between Jules Regnault (who wrote in 1863) and Henri Lefèvre, who was 
writing in the 1870s” (368). However, it is never mentioned if the ticker had 
ever been introduced in Paris, and, obviously, to affirm that an innovation 
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10. In the 1870s, French actuaries started to analyze stock markets with their own tools. 
The first three actuaries who published on this topic were Hippolyte Charlon, Henri Lefèvre, 
and Edmond Maas.
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existed in the London Stock Exchange or in the New York Stock Exchange 
does not demonstrate that this innovation was used in the Paris Stock 
Exchange and that financial practices in the Paris Stock Exchange had to 
be adapted. More generally, Preda’s case that an international community 
of vernacular financiers existed is not convincing because it originates in 
several errors and confusion. Two kinds of confusion can be pointed out: 
(1) confusion about whether the authors were discussing futures or options; 
(2) confusion between algebra and probability in interpreting how securi-
ties were being priced at that time in France.
2.1. Different Problems and Different Goals
The first part of section 7 of Preda’s article explains how “trading in 
options was conceptualized in a way that made it apt for a formal, 
abstract treatment.” The argumentation of this part is confused in sev-
eral respects about securities. It is explained that the distinction between 
speculating (spéculer) and gambling ( jouer) used by Regnault was a 
kind of “strategy” for the authors of that time to analyze options: “Most 
French manuals (and some non-French ones too) . . . followed the strat-
egy of differentiating between speculating (spéculer) and gambling 
(jouer). Jules Regnault (1863, 36), among others, operated with this dis-
tinction. While speculation designated the usual operations in stocks 
and bonds, gambling designated the operations in calls and puts and 
their various combinations” (Preda 2004, 376). There appears here to be 
a twofold confusion about, on the one hand, whether the writers were 
discussing options or other securities, and, on the other hand, the origin 
of the distinction between speculation and gambling in France. Con-
cerning the first confusion, in this section 7, Preda explains that Reg-
nault’s analysis deals with options trading, but Regnault’s book does not 
deal with options. It analyzes a French bond, the rente 3%. In the same 
section, Proudhon is quoted about options trading to explain that “many 
authors of investment manuals argued that options provide the public 
with a fair market” (Preda 2004, 375). However, there is a mistake in the 
translation, because Proudhon deals with futures and not options. More-
over, the justification of the fair market—“a put or a call contract benefits 
both parties and nobody loses, since the money is anyway attracted from 
other sectors of the economy” (Preda 2004, 375–6)—does not particu-
larly fit well for the nineteenth century. It was not until 1973, with the 
appearance of the Black, Scholes, and Merton model, that the fact that 
538 History of Political Economy 38:3 (2006)
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nobody loses could be accepted;11 before that time, the method of pric-
ing options did not allow for that assumption.12 Another point of confu-
sion concerns the origin of the distinction between speculating and gam-
bling in France. Contrary to what the article suggests (Preda 2004, 376), 
this distinction was not a “strategy” used by French financiers who pub-
lished manuals. It was a juridical distinction made by French law at least 
since the end of the eighteenth century—in particular the law about the 
gambling exception (exception de jeu).13 It is misleading to explain that 
while speculation designated the usual operations in stocks and bonds, 
gambling designated the operations in options (Preda 2004, 376). Indeed, 
the French law defined the jeu (gambling), also called agiotage, as bet-
ting based on price differences. Gambling concerned all securities—
shares, bonds, options, and futures—and not merely options, as Preda’s 
article suggested.14 It is also the reason why Regnault used this distinc-
tion although his book does not deal with options. It is equally mis-
leading to consider the coulisse as the unofficial French options market 
(Preda 2004, 367) because it not merely specialized in options but also 
traded shares and bonds.15 For these reasons, authors who analyzed the 
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11. We can accept that the Black-Scholes-Merton model eliminates the risk if all its 
hypotheses are verified and if the stochastic process that represents the variations of the 
underlying asset is well specified. Of course, in reality, risk is never eliminated because the 
hypotheses are never fully verified.
12. See, for instance, Bouleau 1998.
13. This distinction does not date from that time. Today, we would speak in terms of 
speculators and investors.
14. We find the same distinction in Williams 1938.
15. Options trading was legalized in France on 28 March 1885. However, between 1860 and 
that date, options trading, although illegal, was informally recognized, and options were traded 
on all financial markets. Let me remind readers of the following two points. (1) On 22 June 
1859, the Compagnie des agents de change (Syndic of the Stockbrokers) registered the first 
complaint against the coulissiers. The coulissiers were condemned by the “arrêt de la cour de 
Cassation du 19 janvier 1860.” However, they were not condemned because they had traded         
options (although options were not allowed); they were condemned because they had traded 
outside the official market. This “arrêt” (given by the court of cassation, the highest court in 
France) expressed the exclusive right of the agents de change to trade options, although these 
operations were condemned by the law! In other words, the judge was conscious of the obso-
lete nature of the law, and because, according to French law, he could not come into conflict 
with the legislator, he used this arrêt, and the jurisprudence that it created, to obtain a result 
that appeared to him “right.” Therefore, this arrêt led the law to informally recognize options 
beginning in 1860. (2) Moreover, in 1861, the prices of French bonds tended to fall. One reason 
for that fall was the lack of liquidity, which was usually provided by the coulisse. The minister 
for finance convened agents de change to testify to his dissatisfaction with them, because they 
had a monopoly on transactions. Fearing the final suppression of their monopoly, the agents de 
change promised not to prosecute the coulisse again. At the same time, the government tolerated
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French stock market commonly used this juridical distinction between 
speculating and gambling. Consequently, because this distinction is 
an institutional datum (juridical) and not a deliberate strategy, it is 
not possible to deduce from this use that the analysis of Regnault was 
common.
Preda (2004, 360) argues that the vernacular science of investment 
introduced conceptual changes that “were not just a new literary form”: 
“around the same time that Henri Lefèvre and Jules Regnault were writ-
ing,” “general rules of action were formulated” (362). The demonstration 
is supported by an example of “rules concerning options trading,” which 
is reported from a French manual. It is described as “algorithms for pro-
jecting profits and losses.” In this example, the word algorithm is used 
as per a finite ordered set of well-defined rules for the solution of a prob-
lem. However, this kind of example is not an algorithm. According to 
the nineteenth-century terminology of options trading and following the 
example quoted, if “we sell 6,000 francs of French 3 percent bonds at 
71.50 at 1 franc premium and we buy the same quantity at 71.90 at 50 
centimes premium [we] limit gains to 1,000 francs and losses to 800 
francs” (362), there are two possible results.
1.  If the price increases, the options will be exercised, and we lose 
the difference between the two exercise prices (71.90 – 71.50) 3 
(6000/3) = 80 francs.
2.  If the price decreases, the options will not be exercised, and we 
earn the difference between the two primes ((6000/3) 3 1) – 
((6000/3) 3 0.5) = 100 francs.16
There is no algorithm here, only an algebraic calculus. It is also difficult 
to consider it as a specific rule of action or as a rule specific to options 
trading, because it was common, during the nineteenth century, to give 
algebraic examples to express the financial terminology, which was not 
always easy to understand. For instance, the price of buying 60 francs of 
French 3 percent bonds at 71.50 was equal to (71.50) 3 (60/3)) = 143 
francs. Obviously, such an example does not deal with options and it is 
not a rule of action per se.
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 the “illicit” meetings of the coulisse and did not prosecute them any more (Tétreau 1994, 
101–6). In other words, the coulisse was informally recognized. 
16. That strategy is nowadays called a “bullish call spread.”
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2.2. The Unusual Use of Calculus of  
Probability to Analyze Stock Price Variations
Preda argues that it was not uncommon for financial guides to use the 
calculus of probability to analyze stock markets and stock price vari-
ations: “some manuals applied probability calculus to the evaluation of 
financial securities” (Preda 2004, 374) and others “tried to explain the 
causes of fluctuations in securities prices in probabilistic terms” (376). 
However, the argument rests on a confusion between algebra and prob-
ability.
For instance, it is explained that some authors used probability calcu-
lus to price options: 
Starting from past fluctuations in prices, manuals also tried to compute 
the probability of securities prices’ attaining a certain level in a given 
time interval and to take this as a basis for the price of the correspond-
ing option. One favorite method . . . was to take the interest on a state 
bond as a reference point. . . . ; afterward, differences between the yield 
of a given security and the bond’s yield were computed over a period of 
time. On the basis of variations in these differences, the magnitude of 
future fluctuations was inferred; this served as a method for establish-
ing options prices (Medbery 1870, 207–8). (Preda 2004, 377) 
If the above were accurate—if James K. Medbery used probability 
calclus to price options—Preda should have specified that Medbery and 
not Louis Bachelier was the first to do this, contrary to current belief. 
This discovery would be a crucial contribution in the history of financial 
economics, and it would certainly merit an article. However, in the 
extract quoted by Preda, Medbery deals only with shares, not with 
options. Moreover, there is no probability calculus in Medbery but only 
a rule of three. In fact, Medbery prices a security, which has a par value 
equal to 100 and a face return of 7 percent: consider a “stock costing one 
hundred dollars, and paying seven dollars yearly in dividends. . . . Now, 
if the same stock should permanently pay eight per cent, its true value in 
the market would be the equivalent of that sum, which at-seven per cent 
would give eight dollars in interest” (Medbery 1870, 207). If the firm guar-
antees a return of 8 percent—Medbery speaks of “guarantee interest”—
then the price—which he calls “the true value”—X, is equal to X 3 0.07 = 
8, then X = 114.28. Medbery gives a table for the price of this security if 
the guarantee interest is 9 percent, 10 percent, etc.
Comment on Preda / Jovanovic 541
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In the same way, the suggestion that the probability calculus was largely 
used to price securities comes from a questionable interpretation. On 
pages 376–78, three authors—de Mériclet, Medbery, and Pinto—are 
used to argue this common use. Although the article acknowledges that 
de Mériclet and Pinto were strongly opposed to its use, it is deduced that 
“the search for a probabilistic explanation of price variations was well 
on its way” (Preda 2004, 377) and that “this is a biting critique of the 
attempt to develop a causal explanation of price movements based on 
probabilistic calculus and the evaluation of (insider) knowledge. It shows, 
however, that two lines of inquiry were entangled here: (1) the applica-
tion of probability calculus to market decisions and (2) the impossibility 
of causal explanation of price variations” (378). It is added: “The belief 
that probabilistic calculus was an adequate method for analyzing price 
variations was firmly embedded in the popular science of the market” 
(378). No real example is given to support these affirmations except Med-
bery, whom, as I explained, is misinterpreted, because Medbery did not 
use probability calculus. More generally, the article suggests that if authors 
wrote about the possible application of probability calculus to price secu-
rities, the probability calculus to price securities was effectively used in 
practice. However, it is well known that, during the nineteenth century, the 
application of probability calculus was strongly debated and little applied; 
and just because several authors used the words probability or probabi­
listic calculus, they did not necessarily make an analysis based on the 
calculus of probability.17 Consequently, Preda’s article gives no proof 
that the probability calculus was used to analyze price fluctuations or to 
price securities during the nineteenth century. Until now, Regnault is the 
only author known to have used the probability calculus to analyze price 
securities.18
The conclusion of section 7 in Preda’s article provides another exam-
ple of confusion between algebra and probability. It is explained that 
“we encounter a manifold preoccupation with applying probability the-
ory to financial investments,” including applying it “to the analysis of 
French bonds resembling lottery tickets” (Preda 2004, 379). A French 
author is quoted, “Brasilier, who believed that ‘all questions of long term 
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17. During the nineteenth century, the possibility of using probabilistic calculus in moral 
and social sciences was criticized because it was thought as inconsistent with human free 
will. Thus, many authors fought against using it (Breton 1991): although they used the words 
probability or probabilistic calculus, they did not use this kind of calculus. It is exactly what 
we have in the quotations of Pinto and de Mériclet.
18. See Taqqu 2001, 14, or Jovanovic and Le Gall 2001.
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investments are very often only algebraic questions’, [and who] set out to 
elaborate a probabilistic model of the bonds’ lifespan and of the real 
interest rate. These corporate bonds were to be treated as a lottery prob-
lem” (379). In the first part of the present article, we explained the diffi-
culties of including this author in the vernacular science of investments. 
There is another problem here. It is well known that some bonds have 
optional clauses—for instance, refunding clauses. During the nineteenth 
century, and not only during this century, some bonds offered in addi-
tion to interest, the possibility of earning money, thanks to a lottery. Each 
bond had an identification number, and a lottery was organized with these 
numbers. These lotteries were a way to attract investors to the bond. Con-
sequently, some bonds could be linked with a lottery, but the bonds them-
selves were neither analyzed nor treated as a lottery problem, nor as resem-
bling lottery tickets. Brasilier calculates the mathematical expectation of 
the lottery and adds it with the interest to have the mathematical expec-
tation of a bond. 
The confusion between algebra and probability also leads to the mis-
understanding about the contribution of the authors. For instance, Henri 
Lefèvre’s expression, “les lois des différences,” is translated as “laws of 
differences” (Preda 2004, 372), and afterward it is argued that “laws of 
differences” must be understood by lois des écarts (373), an expression 
close to that of Regnault. This association suggests that Lefèvre used 
“loi des écarts,” as Regnault did. The law of deviation—or law of differ-
ence, as Preda has chosen to translate the phrase—is a consequence of 
Regnault’s probabilistic model, the random walk: “the deviation of prices 
is in direct proportion with the square root of time” (Regnault 1863, 50). 
Nevertheless, Lefèvre never used a random walk model in his analysis. He 
did not use probability calculus; he only calculated differences between 
two prices. Thus, in Lefèvre, the difference is only a subtraction, which is 
totally different from the consequence of a random walk model. Moreover, 
the title of Preda’s article can lead to confusion, because, except Jules Reg-
nault and Louis Bachelier, all other authors studied did not deal with the 
random walk hypothesis.
3. Concluding Remarks
In the end, Preda’s article fails to demonstrate the existence of an inter-
national “vernacular science of financial markets” that shared the same 
tools, hypotheses, and methods. No evidence is given that other authors 
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besides Regnault used the probability calculus to analyze stock price 
variations before 1900. There is no demonstration that Regnault’s book 
was similar to other publications of that time. Moreover, if some authors 
discussed the possible application of probability calculus, no evidence 
is given that they built a theoretical model or a theoretical analysis in 
finance. The situation seems more complex than Preda’s article suggests. 
Although there was a movement that started to deal with stock markets, 
as the article clearly exposes, it was not homogeneous. Currently, we 
only know of two authors, Regnault and Lefèvre, who imported, at that 
time, tools, methods, and concepts from scientific disciplines to analyze 
stock markets and to attempt to create a new science (i.e., a new academic 
science, to use Preda’s term). However, these attempts did not lead to the 
creation of a new academic science at that time; such a science was only 
constituted during the twentieth century. From this viewpoint, the work of 
these authors cannot be included in the vernacular economics described in 
Preda’s article. As Philippe Le Gall and I have shown, Regnault—as well 
as Lefèvre—was not an isolated author (because his work was the product 
of its time),19 but he was the first to introduce methods and hypotheses 
nowadays used to analyze stock markets. Preda’s article helps us better 
understand the progressive movement that took place during the nine-
teenth century, but this movement needs to be analyzed more carefully.
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